

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MYRCELIE MORALES,

v. Plaintiff,  
DIVERSIFIED ADJUSTMENT Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_

SERVICE, INCORPORATED

Defendant.

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**COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. This is an action for actual and statutory damages brought in response to Defendants' violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq.* (hereinafter "FDCPA") which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and unfair practices, and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "TCPA").

**II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. Jurisdiction of this court arises under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
2. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) in that the Defendant transacts business here and the conduct complained of occurred here.
3. That Plaintiffs' cause of action under the TCPA is predicated upon the same facts and circumstances that give rise to their federal cause of action. As such, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' TCPA causes of action pursuant 28 U.S.C. §1337.

**III. PARTIES**

4. Plaintiff, Myrcelie Morales, is a natural person residing in the County of Erie and State of New York and is a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3).

5. Defendant, Diversified Adjustment Service, Incorporated (hereinafter “DAS”) is a foreign business corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Minnesota and is a “debt collector” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6).
6. Defendant regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due another.
7. At all times relevant herein, each Plaintiffs were and are a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(32).
8. Defendant, at all times relevant herein, owned, operated and/or controlled “customer premises equipment” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(14), that originated, routed, and/or terminated telecommunications.
9. At all times relevant herein, Defendant has used the United States mail service, telephone, telegram and other instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commerce to attempt to collect consumer debt allegedly owed to another.
10. Defendant, at all times relevant herein, engaged in “interstate communications” as that term is defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(22).
11. Defendant, at all times relevant herein, engaged in “telecommunications” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(43).
12. Defendant, at all times relevant herein, used, controlled and/or operated “wire communications” as defined by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §153(52), that existed as instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commerce.
13. Defendant, at all relevant times herein, used, controlled and/or operated “automatic telephone dialing systems” as defined by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(1) and 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(f)(1).
14. The acts of the Defendant alleged hereinafter were performed by its employees acting within the scope of their actual or apparent authority.
15. All references to “Defendant” herein shall mean the Defendant or an employee of the Defendant.

#### **IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

16. That upon information and belief, Plaintiff does not owe any debt to the Defendant or its client, National Fuel.
17. That upon information and belief, Defendant is attempting to collect an alleged debt of \$132 for National Fuel service. This will be referred to as the “subject debt.”

18. That the subject debt arose out of a transaction in which money, services or property, which was the subject of the transaction, was primarily for personal, family and/or household purposes. As such, said debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).
19. That on or about the summer of 2020, Defendant began using an automatic telephone dialing system to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone attempting to collect the subject debt.
20. That upon Plaintiff answering her phone, there would be a pause and clicking sound and then the Defendant representative would come on the line
21. That during one of the first aforementioned calls, the Plaintiff informed Defendant she did not owe the subject debt as her national fuel account was current. Plaintiff then requested Defendant stop calling her.
22. That upon information and belief Defendant continued to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone through November 2020.
23. That Plaintiff has on multiple occasions informed the Defendant she does not owe the alleged debt and to stop calling her.
24. Plaintiff never gave consent to Defendant to call her cellular telephone.
25. Many if not all of the above-mentioned telephone calls were made using an automatic telephone dialing systems wherein Defendant left artificial and/or prerecorded voice messages.
26. That the calls made by the Defendant rendered Plaintiff’s telephone unavailable to receive incoming calls or to otherwise use during the unwanted calls.
27. That Plaintiff was annoyed and upset over receiving the above calls from the Defendant.
28. That as a result of Defendant’s acts Plaintiff became nervous, upset, anxious, and suffered from emotional distress.

**V. COUNT ONE**  
(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act  
and 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.)

29. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 28 above.
30. The conduct of Defendant as described in this complaint violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.) as follows:

- A Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §16923e; 15 U.S.C. §16923e(2); 15 U.S.C. §16923e(5); 15 U.S.C. §16923e(10); and 15 U.S.C. §1692f by attempting to collect a debt from the Plaintiff that she does not owe.
  - B) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §16923d and 15 U.S.C. §16923d(5) by continuing to call the Plaintiff despite being informed that she doesn't owe any debt to National Fuel and to stop calling her, the natural consequence of which is to annoy, abuse, and/or harass the Plaintiff.
31. That as a result of the Defendant's FDCPA violations as alleged herein, Plaintiff became nervous, upset, anxious and suffered from emotional distress.

## **VI. COUNT TWO**

(Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991  
and 47 C.F.R.64.1200, et seq.)

- 32. Plaintiff repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding and succeeding paragraphs in this complaint as if each of them was reprinted herein below.
- 33. The Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, unfairly, unlawfully, intentionally, deceptively and/or fraudulently violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R.14.1200, et seq. and TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by initiating telephone calls to Plaintiff's telephone service and/or using an artificial and/or prerecorded voice to deliver messages without having the consent of Plaintiff to leave such messages.
- 34. The acts and/or omissions of the Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, as described in this Complaint, were done unfairly, unlawfully, intentionally, deceptively and fraudulently and absent bona fide error, lawful right, legal defense, legal justification or legal excuse.
- 35. The acts and/or omissions of the Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, as described in this Complaint, were not acted or omitted pursuant to 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(f)(2).
- 36. As a causally-direct and legally proximate result of the above violations of the TCPA, the Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, as described in this Complaint, caused the Plaintiff to sustain damages as a result of their innumerable telephone calls that harassed, annoyed and abused Plaintiff, and disturbed her peace and tranquility at home and elsewhere.

37. As a causally-direct and legally proximate result of the above violations of the TCPA, the Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, as described in this Complaint, caused the Plaintiff to sustain damages and experience emotional distress.
38. As a causally-direct and legally proximate result of the above violations of the TCPA, the Defendant at all times material and relevant hereto, as described in this Complaint, is liable to actual damages, statutory damages, treble damages, and costs and attorneys' fees.
39. Plaintiff received multiple telephone calls from an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial and/or prerecorded voice entitling Plaintiff to Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents (\$500.00) for each artificial and/or prerecorded telephone call pursuant to the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B).
40. The Defendant caused said telephone calls of an artificial and/or prerecorded nature to be placed willfully and/or knowingly entitling each Plaintiff to a maximum of treble damages, pursuant to TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3).

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered against the Defendant for:

- (a) Actual damages;
- (b) Statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k and 47 U.S.C. §223(b)(3)(B).
- (c) Treble statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227b(3).
- (d) Costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

And for such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

## **VI. JURY DEMAND**

Please take notice that Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action.

Dated: December 18, 2020

/s/ Seth J. Andrews  
Seth J. Andrews, Esq.  
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